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Questions and answers in Lamjung Yolmo: The evidential ‘anticipation rule’

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Abstract

Many Tibetic (Tibeto-Burman) languages have been reported to have interrogative structures where the question uses the evidential form that is most likely to be used in the answer. This orientation of evidential source to the perspective of the addressee has been described as the ‘anticipation rule’ in the literature on Tibetan and related languages. I investigate interrogative use in Lamjung Yolmo, a Tibetic variety of Nepal, to illustrate the nature of this ‘anticipation’ pattern in interaction. In Lamjung Yolmo speakers base their ‘anticipation’ of the respondent’s evidential use on the general distribution of these forms, as well as attending to their interlocutor’s knowledge state and modifying evidential values in question-asking to better reflect the specific interactional context. I also look specifically at self-answered questions, which provide a unique insight into evidential choice as the speaker and addressee are the same person. Interrogative uses of evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo are an example of cognitively complex interactional use of grammatical forms. This paper furthers our knowledge of the relationship between evidentiality and interrogativity, and demonstrates one way people can track each other’s knowledge status in interaction.

Key words: evidentiality, interrogative, Tibeto-Burman

1. Introduction

As evidentiality becomes a well-described grammatical phenomenon cross-linguistically, analysis has moved from typological exploration of the semantic and grammatical properties of evidentials to investigations of how these forms are used by people in interaction (see Michael, 2008 for reported speech, San Roque et al., 2015 for questions, and some sections of Aikhenvald 2004). In this paper I look at the use of evidentiality in questions and answers in Lamjung

Yolmo, a Tibetic variety (Tibeto-Burman) spoken in Nepal. In this language, questions are asked using the evidential or epistemic form most likely to be used in the addressee's answer. In (1) a woman, BSL, walks into a house and asks the people inside where her sister is:

- 1) a) *sánu kàla d̀ù lée*
 Sanu where COP.PE PART
 ‘where is Sanu?’ (BSL 23/01/2011 book 8:12)¹

BSL uses the perceptual evidential *d̀ù*, not because she herself has any visual or other sensory evidence of where Sanu is, but because she expects that her interlocutor will have existing perceptual evidence of Sanu's location and be able to satisfactorily answer her question based on this evidence.

Evidentials are grammatical forms that mark the source of information, and in declarative utterances they prototypically indicate the speaker's perspective² (de Haan, 2005). In languages like Yolmo, evidentials in questions are used to encode the addressee's perspective. Addressee-orientation in questions has been attested in many related languages, including Standard Tibetan (Tournadre, 2008), Sherpa (Schöttelndreyer, 1980) and Dzongkha (Driem, 1998:131-132). Tournadre and LaPolla (2014:245) refer to addressee-orientation as the ‘anticipation rule’, as the evidential used in the question anticipates the most felicitous evidential for the answer. This has also been referred to in the literature on Tibetan as an ‘origo shift’ (Garrett, 2001:225) from speaker to addressee. A similar orientation to the perspective of the speaker has also been observed in other language families (San Roque et al., 2015). In this paper I look at questions and answers in interaction to better understand

¹ Appendix B lists the transcription conventions. Each example includes a reference with the speaker initials and the archival file number of the recording, which is also the date. Naturalistic examples also include a time code. Where examples were from observed interactions that were not recorded the speaker, date and notebook reference are given.

² As per San Roque et al., (2005) I am using the term ‘perspective’ in a non-technical sense to refer to the person whose perspective the evidentials appear to be marking (the speaker or the addressee) in the interaction.

the nature of the ‘anticipation rule’. People are able to track the epistemic and evidential status of their interlocutors across interaction (Heritage, 2012); in this paper I demonstrate this is true of evidential marking as people make best-guess attempts at encoding their interlocutors’ stance in questions, although they can also track and modify these expectations. The preference is for ‘type-conforming’ (Raymond, 2003) answers, as the speaker expects the response to be framed with the anticipated evidential value. In answering these questions, people are not constrained to the form that was used in the question, and can use another form if it is more appropriate for their evidential or epistemic knowledge-state.

In this paper I focus specifically on examples that have interrogative grammatical features and the pragmatic value of questioning, which is a speech act request for information (Chisholm et al., 1984). I will refer to these constructions as ‘questions’ and the responses that are elicited as ‘answers’. Of course, there are other grammatical structures that can be used to request information from interlocutors, and interrogative constructions can be used as indirect speech acts for functions like directives (Searle, 1969; Levinson, 1983; Sadock and Zwicky, 1985:191). Once the basic features and functions of the ‘rule of anticipation’ have been considered in relation to ‘canonical’ questions there is scope to extend these research questions to indirect speech act types.

Yolmo is a Tibetic³ language of the Tibeto-Burman family spoken in Nepal. The main population of Yolmo speakers are in the Melamchi and Helambu valleys, just south of Kyirong country, and migrated to that area several centuries ago (Clarke, 1980). There are also a number of diaspora communities within Nepal that were settled around a century ago, with the Lamjung group being one of them. These groups have speaker numbers of 500-1500 people and have their own varieties of the language (Author).

Like many Tibetic languages, Lamjung Yolmo has a set of epistemic and evidential distinctions in the copula verb set and related verbal auxiliaries (see §3.1). The distinctions in Lamjung Yolmo include evidential markers of

³ ‘Tibetic’ refers to languages that share a common ancestor in Old Tibetan, or a related variety. See Tournadre (2014) for further discussion of the ‘Tibetic’ grouping.

perceptual evidence, egophoric and general fact, as well as a dubitative, which is an epistemic marker of reduced certainty. The language also has a reported speech evidential as a clause-final particle. Although there are many grammatical contexts in which a form with evidential weight must be used, there are also grammatical constructions that do not include an evidential copula or auxiliary, including basic past and non-past tense constructions. See Author for a detailed description of the copula and auxiliary evidential forms.

Examples of Lamjung Yolmo used in this paper are drawn from a corpus that includes a range of elicited and natural data types.⁴ Different data types offer different advantages for analysis. Eliciting question and answer pairs is useful for testing grammaticality and structural features, but fails to capture the interactional knowledge states of participants. Conversely, completely naturalistic data gives a more realistic indication of why and how people ask and respond to questions. In the discussion of the methodology of their 10-language survey of the form and function of questions and answers Stivers and Enfield (2010:2620) stress the importance of natural data in accounts of language use in social interaction. The challenge of working with this kind of data is that it can be difficult or impossible to track the knowledge states of each participant when they bring so much prior knowledge to an. An intermediary data type, which Himmelmann (1998) refers to as ‘staged’ elicitation, was also used. With ‘staged’ elicitation the researcher provides the contextual frame for an open-ended task. This methodology allows for clearer tracking of participant knowledge state over the duration of the interaction, as items or narrative events can be tracked from their introduction to the discourse across the time they are discussed, all while participants are free to shape their interaction with these items and their interlocutor(s). The benefits of structured elicitation types are illustrated in San Roque, Gawne, et al. (2012:165), which discusses the Family Story task, which I draw on in this paper. In this paper I discuss examples drawn from a number of such tasks. The first is the game ‘twenty questions’ where one participant has a photograph of a common household item and the other must ask yes/no questions to guess what the item is. The

⁴ The collection can be viewed at catalog.paradisec.org.au/collections/LG1.

second is the ‘hidden objects’ task, initially described by Vokurková (2008) in her work on Standard Tibetan epistemics, where objects are hidden under a cloth. Participants guess what they are, gaining more sensory information at each stage; first only looking at the shape of the object with the cloth over it, then feeling the item over the cloth and then seeing the objects without the cloth. Vokurková used quite large objects (such as buckets and bike helmets), but for portability I used smaller domestic items: glasses, a hat, a book, a packet of noodles and an onion or lemon. The third task was to work together to describe optical illusions printed on A4 sheets of paper. Finally, two picture stimulus tasks were used, the Family Story task (described in San Roque, Gawne, et al., 2012) and Jackal and Crow (Kelly and Gawne, 2011). The Family Story is a set of picture cards that participants must describe and then use to create a narrative of a family drama; Jackal and Crow is a morality tale where the Jackal uses flattery to trick the Crow into dropping his food and is more suitable for tasks with children. Almost all structured tasks and conversational data involved dyads or triads of male and female speakers of various ages, and the primary researcher (LG) was present for all recording sessions and administered some tasks. All of these methods are described in more detail in [Author]. Appendix A lists all the non-elicitation recordings and the participants in those recordings.

In the following sections I consider the literature on question and answer structures in relation to evidentiality, and particularly in Tibeto-Burman languages (§2) and give an overview of the structural properties of questions and answers in Lamjung Yolmo (§3). I then turn to how questions with evidential values are used in interpersonal/conversational interaction (§4), with particular attention given to the nature of the ‘anticipation rule’ (§4.1) and self-answered questions (§4.2).

2. Question and answer structures cross-linguistically

There has been a great deal of work on the syntactic and semantic features of questions cross-linguistically (including, but not limited to Hiz, 1978; Chisholm, Millic, et al., 1984; Comorovski, 1996; Cheng, 1997; Lahiri, 2001). Many grammatical descriptions of languages include a section on question

structures, but few also examine answer structures in the same section, often not even including answers in example sentences (San Roque et al. (2015:2) also note that there is a paucity of description of interrogative constructions for evidential languages).

Aikhenvald's cross-linguistic typology of evidential structures includes a discussion of the interaction of evidentials and interrogative structures (2004:242-249). San Roque et al. (2015) build on this work with a cross-linguistic investigation into the interaction of evidentiality and interrogative structures with a stronger focus on discourse context. The languages surveyed by Aikhenvald (2004) and San Roque et al. (2015) demonstrate that there are a variety of ways that evidentiality and interrogativity can interact. In some languages, evidential forms used in declaratives cannot be used at all in questions, and an alternative set of evidential or non-evidential forms are used. In other languages there is only a partial restriction on evidential forms in interrogative structures. The final option, which they found to be quite common in the languages they surveyed, is that evidential forms can be used in both declarative and interrogative contexts, although the function of the evidential may vary between the two contexts. San Roque et al. (2015:9-11) and Aikhenvald (2004:424) note that one option is for the evidential used in the interrogative to 'reflect the addressee's information source.

There is a small but highly relevant body of work within the Tibeto-Burman family on questions, their relationship to evidentiality and broader implications for interaction. Sun (1993:956) observes in Amdo Tibetan that the evidential forms generally used with first person also occur with second person in questions, thus this 'self person' form "is not deictically bound to the speaker" but can also orient to the addressee. Garrett (2001) unpacks the mechanism behind the same phenomenon in Standard Tibetan.⁵ Garrett separates the 'origo' and the speaker: If we take evidentials to encode the evidence *someone*

⁵ In this paper I use 'Standard Tibetan' as a collective term for work that refers to Lhasa Tibetan, Standard Tibetan, Modern Tibetan, or simply Tibetan. While I use the term Standard Tibetan to discuss all of these varieties, I acknowledge that there are some differences between the 'Standard' and 'Lhasa' varieties (Róna-Tas, 1985:160-161).

has for something, it is not necessary that the ‘someone’ is the speaker.⁶ The origo then is “the person from whose perspective a given evidential is evaluated” (Garrett 2001:4); in the case of questions there is an ‘origo shift’ from the speaker to their interlocutor. Garrett (2001:225) argues that “...not only does a question expect an answer, but its very form encodes information about how it’s supposed to be answered”. Therefore, not only does the speaker have to ask the right question of the right person, but they have to ask them for the most appropriate evidence as well. For example, in Standard Tibetan, Garrett (2001) shows how different copulas are used in different questions. In (2) and (3) both questions are directed at a second person, but while (2) uses an egophoric copula (3) uses a perceptual evidential form. This is because these evidentials have different functions, and are appropriate for asking about different kinds of knowledge. Egophoric evidentiality is a common category in Tibetic languages (Author, forthcoming), and marks the speaker’s information source as their personal knowledge (Tournadre, 2008:296).⁷ In (2) the addressee is expected to know of their own travel based on their personal knowledge, having undertaken the journey.

2) *khyed.rang* *lha.sa-la* *phyin-pa-yin-pas*
 you Lhasa-LOC go-[EGO.PST]-Q
 ‘did you go to Lhasa?’ (Garrett 2001:228, ex. 3)

nga *lha.sa-la* *phyin-pa-yin*
 I Lhasa-LOC go-[EGO.PST]
 ‘I went to Lhasa.’ (Garrett 2001:227, ex. 1)

Perceptual evidentials, also known as sensory, are used for all five senses in Tibetic languages (Hill, 2012:406; Author). Perceptual evidentials are also used

⁶ The perspective does not always have to be that of the speaker, however, in a survey of definitions of evidentiality, Brugman and Macauley (2010) did find it was common for ‘speaker source’ to feature as part of the definition.

⁷ This category is also called ‘ego’ (Garrett, 2001), ‘personal’ (Hill, 2012), ‘participant specific’ (Agha, 1993:157) and ‘self-centred’ (Denwood, 2000).

for discussing a person's own internal state, which is not accessible to others, for which that person has direct sensory knowledge. This is known as 'endopathic' knowledge (Tournadre and Dorje, 2003:167). In (3) the person is expected to know if they are hungry by consulting their internal feelings. Even though both questions in (2) and (3) are directed to the addressee and are about the addressee, the semantics of the evidentials and the expectation of the kind of evidence means that the question-asker uses different evidentials.

3) *khyed.rang* *grod.khog* *ltogs-gi-'dug-gas*
 you stomach hunger-[DIR IMP]-Q
 'are you hungry?' (Garrett 2001:228, ex. 4)

nga *grod.khog* *ltogs-gi-'dug*
 I stomach hunger-[DIR IMP]
 'I'm hungry' (Garrett 2001:227, ex. 2)

Tournadre and LaPolla (2014:245) refer to this feature of evidential use in questions as the 'anticipation rule' (for earlier discussion see Tournadre and Konchok Jiatso, 2001:74; Tournadre and Dorje, 2003:94-95). Tournadre and LaPolla (2014:245) give their definition of the rule:

"The anticipation rule states that whenever the speaker asks a direct question of the hearer, she should anticipate the access/source available to the hearer and select the evidential auxiliary/copula accordingly. The hearer will often answer using the same auxiliary/ copula as in the question but he is not obliged to."

Parallels can be drawn here with Raymond's (2003) work on type conformity. Raymond focuses specifically on yes/no questions, but in looking at questions and answers as 'adjacency pairs', they highlight "the normative constraints that the type of first action exerts on the type of action with which the recipient should respond" (Raymond 2003:942). That is to say, that in asking a

question using a certain evidential the speaker is constraining the expected answer type that is possible. Raymond's discussion focuses on yes/no question structures; if a speaker asks a yes/no question then they expect the answer to be either yes or no. Either of these answers would be type-conforming, while an answer with some other piece of information would be non-conforming. As I will demonstrate in §3, Lamjung Yolmo has question structures that include polar (yes/no) questions, alternative questions and content questions, all of which anticipate a particular response structure. Raymond's type conformity can be extended to also include an expectation that when a question is asked with a particular evidential form that a type-conforming answer would also use that form, and a mismatched evidential in the answer would not be conforming to the expected knowledge state framed in the question.

Taking Tournadre and LaPolla's (2015) observation about question structures being influenced by the anticipated answer, and Raymond's (2003) observations about how questions exert constraints on possible answers, we find the mutual influence of interactional participants. The person asking the question does their best, based on their knowledge of the evidential system and the specific context, to frame the question in a way that is likely to have the most useful evidential value, and then it is up to the addressee to either accept this and use the evidential in the answer, or to decide that it is insufficiently close to the evidence they have and give an answer with a different value.

De Villiers, Garfield, et al. (2009:34-35) explore the interactional implications of using the mismatched evidentials in questions and answers in Standard Tibetan. If the person asking a question uses a non-felicitous evidential then the onus is on the person answering the question to use the one that best reflects their knowledge state. Failure to shift to the evidential form that best reflects knowledge state is not only pragmatically infelicitous but can be considered grammatically incorrect by speakers, as are all utterances that are spoken with an evidential form that does not match the speaker's knowledge state. Thus in Standard Tibetan it is possible to separate out the knowledge state the question-asker expects from the addressee's claimed knowledge state by examining not only the question, but also the answer. This also fits with Raymond's (2003) observations about type conformity. Although a question can

constrain the addressee's potential next turn, it is up to the addressee to decide whether to align with the question or not; it is "fundamentally interpretive (as opposed to coercive)" in character (Raymond 2003:954).

Aikhenvald (2004:242) and San Roque et al. (2015:9-11) note that the switch to addressee perspective is quite common cross-linguistically, but it is not clear how the addressee perspective is determined. There are two possible reasons why a speaker may form an idea of which evidential an interlocutor will answer with. The first is that this is a dynamic feature of the interaction, and speakers are able to track the knowledge states of their interlocutors. For example, the question asker may only choose to ask a question about events in another village using a perceptual evidential rather than a reported evidential if they know from the conversation that their interlocutor has recently been in that village. The second reason is that there are learned expectations regarding which type of evidential knowledge status is appropriate to which type of question that is being asked, based on the semantics of the evidential form and conventionalised expectation. For example, any question directed at a person about his or her actions will generally take an egophoric form in Tibetic languages. Of course, these two possible mechanisms do not exist in isolation from each other. Conventionalised expectation may arise from a frequent contextual use. In §4.1 I use examples from interaction to demonstrate that speakers appear to rely on generally expected knowledge state, but can also draw on the specific context to modify those expectations.

Although Tournadre and LaPolla (2014:245) suggest that this anticipation rule is cross-linguistically rare, it is unlikely that this is the case. San Roque et al. (2015:9) observe a similar mechanism to the 'anticipation rule' in a number of languages in different families, which they refer to as an evidential 'flip' "to reflect the addressee's information source". They draw on examples from Duna (Duna-Bogaia, Papua New Guinea), Wintu (Wintuan, California) and Magar (Tibeto-Burman, Nepal) and Gitksan (Tsimshianic, Canada) that all appear to conform to the 'anticipation rule'.

If we move from evidentiality and interrogativity to the literature on egophoricity⁸ and conjunct/disjunct (San Roque, Floyd, et al., 2012; Floyd et al., forthcoming), we find a potentially rich set of languages that exhibit this ‘anticipation rule’. Egophoricity is the grammatical marking of direct personal involvement or knowledge, and cross-linguistically shows a tendency to be associated with the speaker in statements and with the addressee in questions. One way such a pattern can arise is by an ‘anticipation rule’ or ‘evidential flip’ where the evidential preferred for first person declarative is therefore most likely to be the one used in a question to an addressee. Understanding the anticipation rule is therefore important for understanding one of the main mechanisms of egophoricity.

Once we look beyond evidentiality and egophoricity, it is even less likely that the ‘anticipation rule’ is unusual. Lehmann (2012) discusses modal operators in a variety of languages, including English, that systematically orient to the addressee in questions. In (4b) the modal ‘may’ is oriented to the addressee’s ability to decide who is able to perform an action. I have included the epistemic information in brackets because addressees do not always answer with the modal information. I have also given a naturalistic example from the British National Corpus in (4c),⁹ where the modal from the question is included in the answer. This interaction was part of a formal meeting, which may have influenced the longer, formal answer to the question.

4) a) Q: Did she give the dog a biscuit?

A: Yes (she did).

⁸ Despite the similarity of the terms it is worth keeping egophoricity and egophoric evidentiality separate. Egophoricity refers to a relationship between grammatical person and verbal marking (San Roque et al., forthcoming), while egophoric evidentiality refers specifically to a category of evidentiality (Author, forthcoming). Egophoric evidentiality may be a key feature of systems of egophoricity, but does not have to be.

⁹ Data cited herein has been extracted from the British National Corpus Online service, managed by Oxford University Computing Services on behalf of the BNC Consortium. All rights in the texts cited are reserved.

b) Q May she give the dog a biscuit?

A: Yes (she may).

c) SP:PS1NE: Thank you. Dr (-----) do you accept?

SP:F86PSUNK: Yes, may I just say a word here (unclear)

SP:PS1NE: Yes you **may**.

(BNC: Inserting rules and regulations (Pub/instit) 1985-1994.)

Of course modal operators in English are more flexible, while evidential anticipation is a basic feature of forming a grammatical utterance in a language like Lamjung Yolmo. Even in Lamjung Yolmo the ‘anticipation rule’ makes it possible to ask questions of your interlocutor using the dubitative, which is not evidential but epistemic (I discuss this in relation to Example 21). Speakers have to be able to assess knowledge state in terms of content, so they know what question to ask of the their interlocutor. Speakers track stance and knowledge state as well as content, to help them ask the most appropriate question. Orienting stance towards the addressee in interaction is in no way as unusual as some descriptions of Tibeto-Burman languages would indicate. While it is often observed as a feature of Tibetan languages there is a lack of detailed exploration of how this feature of questions and answers plays out in interaction. I address this gap and explore the nature of the ‘rule’ in terms of how it is applied, and the ‘anticipation’ with regards to being built on conventionalized expectation, and the influenced of interactional knowledge state tracking.

3. The structure of questions and answers in Lamjung Yolmo

In this section I provide an overview of syntactic features of questions and answers in Lamjung Yolmo, including those sentence types that do not include evidential forms. I start with an overview of the Lamjung Yolmo evidential

system (§3.1) and general observations about question structures (§3.2), before looking specifically at polar (§3.2), alternative (§3.3) and content (§3.4) questions.

3.1 Evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo

Lamjung Yolmo has a number of evidential and epistemic distinctions marked in the copula verb series. All copula constructions require one of these evidential or epistemic forms. A subset of these copulas are also used as auxiliaries in complex verb constructions, which means that evidentials occur in more than just copula constructions. In this section I introduce the main semantic distinctions of the copular verb set, and some features of their syntactic distribution. A more detailed description of the copula verbs and their use is given in [Author].

The egophoric equative is *yimba*, which is used with two noun phrases. The existential *yè*, with the unique past tense form *yèke*, are used for existential constructions, but also constructions indicating location, possession and attribution. The egophoric in Standard Tibetan (examples 2 and 3) is a very specific and narrow category, used specifically for volitional states, actions and events of the speaker, or someone they are closely affiliated with (Tournadre, 2008). The scope of the egophoric in Lamjung Yolmo is not as strict in terms of who the referent is, but encodes that the information is known personally by the speaker.

The perceptual evidential is *dù*, with *dùba* functioning as a more emphatic variant. It is used mostly in existential, locational, attribution and possession constructions, but there are marginal cases of *dùba* being used as an equative copula as well. It is used for all sensory perception, including sight, sound, smell, taste and touch, as well as perception of one's own internal state.

There is also a little-used 'general fact' copula *ònge*. This form is used for very generally known facts about the world, such as lemons being sour and sugar being sweet. This form turns up reliably in elicited contexts, but almost never in the non-elicited interactions and open-ended tasks. Those times where it does turn up it is generally performing the role of an agreement, similar to

English 'ok'. As it occurs infrequently in the corpus, and never in question structures, it is not discussed in this paper. Unlike other Tibetic varieties, Lamjung Yolmo does not have a commonly used gnomic, neutral or factual evidential, and these functions are generally left to the egophoric, as part of its much broader role than the egophoric in Standard Tibetan (Tournadre, 2008).¹⁰

This is not an exclusively evidential paradigm, as there are also two dubitative forms; a dubitative equative copula (*yindo*) and an existential copula (*yèto*). These copulas are used to indicate reduced certainty on the part of the speaker. The dubitatives are not inferential evidentials, as there is no indicator of source needed to make a statement with a dubitative.

All evidential forms have a corresponding negative form. Table 1 provides an overview of the copulas, grouped by evidential/epistemic semantics and syntactic features. The negative forms are given below the affirmative forms.

Table 1: The Lamjung Yolmo copula system

	Egophoric	Dubitative	Perceptual evidence	General fact
Equation	yimba mìn	yindo mìndo	(dùba) (mìnduba)	-
Existential present	yè mè	yèto mèto	dù mìndu	ònge mèongge
past	yèke yèba		dùba mìnduba	
	mèke mèba			

¹⁰ This is not uncommon in Southern Tibetic languages, with the Kyirong cognate having a similar distribution (Huber 2005). Cross-linguistically Oksapmin (Ok-Oksapmin) has a participatory-factual category (Loughnane 2009:252).

The existential subset of copulas, except the general fact, are grouped together as they can be used as verbal auxiliaries in certain constructions, which is a common function of copula verbs in Tibetan languages (Hari, 2010; Tournadre and Dorje, 2003). In these constructions copulas can add tense information as well as epistemic or evidential information. The structures that include copulas as auxiliaries are perfective (5a) and imperfective (5b), habitual (5c) and narrative past (5d). Basic past (5e) and non-past (5f) verb constructions include a verb suffix, but do not take auxiliaries.

5) a) *ṇà=la láure kwèla tér-ti yè*
1SG=DAT soldier(Nep) clothing give-PFV AUX.COP
'the soldiers gave me clothing' (SBL 101124-03 25:42)

b) *ṇà tó sà-teran yè*
1SG rice.cooked eat-IPFV AUX.PE
'I am eating rice' (AL 100929-01)

c) *ṇà ṇima ṭanṇmaran khúra sà yè*
1SG sun every bread eat COP.EGO
'I eat bread every day' (AL 101001-01)

d) *pèemi gòo róp-sin dù*
wife head break-PST AUX.PE
'the wife's head was broken' (SBL 101124-03 01:10)

e) *tòṇla dènmu lè zò-sin*
before like.this work make-PST
'before (he) worked like this' (AL 091108-01 39:20)

f) *tiriṇ tèmba sàl-ke gàrila*
today remember-PRES at.the.time
'today, when I remember' (SBL 101124-03 08:44)

Therefore, while all copula verb constructions require an epistemic or evidential choice, only some lexical verb constructions will take an evidential form. Speakers of Lamjung Yolmo do not actually have a wide range of evidential functions to choose between, it most often comes down to the perceptual evidential and the egophoric – although there are many contexts in which either is appropriate, as I discuss in [Author]. Also, as I show for question and answer forms in interaction, it is not uncommon for utterances to not include a full sentence, but instead speakers will use reduced fragments that do not include auxiliary forms.

Lamjung Yolmo also has a reported speech evidential which is not part of the copula system, but is a clause final particle.¹¹ This particle /ó is most often used to report someone else's speech to another person. As it is a particle that sits outside the reported speech event it can be used in conjunction with all the other evidential forms if the, with the other evidential forms used in the reported utterance. The reported speech particle refers to the current speaker's evidence while any internal evidential forms reflect the evidence of the originally spoken utterance. Example (6) is AL reporting on a listening to a recording of RL talking.

- 6) khí tó sà-teran yèke ló
 dog rice.cooked eat-IPFV COP.EGO.PST RS
 'the dog was eating rice (he said).' (AL 120208-01, RL 120218-01)

The reported speech particle cannot be negated, but it can be used in questions, which I discuss in §3.2 below.

3.2 General question structure

There is no word order variation to mark questions in Lamjung Yolmo, but rising intonation can be used as a contextual cue. I group Lamjung Yolmo question structures into polar, alternative and content questions, and discuss the specifically relevant structural features of these in the sections below. Polar

¹¹ The reported speech particle is discussed in more detail in [author].

questions (§3.3) involve essentially a yes-no choice, alternative questions (§3.4) present two or more alternative possible answers, which may be yes-no or a choice of options, and content questions (§3.5.) include the use of an interrogative pronoun and restrict possible conforming answers much less.

The past tense verbal suffix *-pa* is more common in interrogative utterances than declarative utterances, but is not exclusively used in interrogatives. Not all *pa/ba* final copulas demonstrate the same preference for interrogative distribution. All evidential forms are possible in both question asking and question answering, although not every question needs to be asked or answered with an evidential form, as they do not occur in all syntactic contexts. It is possible to ask and answer a question without overt expression of the copula that carries the evidential value. I discuss all of these features in more detail in this section.

There is no difference in word order between a declarative and interrogative utterance (7).

7) a) *khó yòlmo yimba*
 3SG.M Yolmo COP.EGO
 'he is yolmo/is he yolmo?' (VL 101224-01)

b) *mò=ki tó sà-sin*
 3SG.F=ERG rice eat-PST
 'she ate rice/has she eaten rice?' (AL 100928-01)

Rising intonation, as well as contextual cues, can be used to distinguish questions from statements. For example, in the hidden objects task both ST and her sister KL say '*pyáz yimba*,' but while ST is asking a question (8a) with rising intonation, KL is making a statement (8b).

8) a) *pyáz yimba*
 onion(Nep) COP.EGO
 'is it an onion?' (ST 120304-01 03:20)

- b) *pyáz* *yimba*
 onion(Nep) COP.EGO
 'it is an onion.' (KL 120304-02 03:14)

In all types of questions the verbal suffix *-pa* can be used with lexical verbs to indicate that the sentence is an interrogative, but only for past tense. The suffix is not exclusive to interrogatives, but it always marks past tense, which is why I gloss it as PST. Example (9a) is an elicited interrogative and an elicited declarative about the same event. Note that the speaker preference is to frame the interrogative using the *-pa* past form, but the declarative using the *-sin* past form. Example (9b) is from a round of twenty questions when AL could not recall if a question had been asked already.

- 9) a) Q: *khé* *tàp-pa*
 2SG fall-PST
 'Did you fall?' (AL 100928-01)

A: *khé* *tàp-sin*
 2SG fall-PST
 'you fell.' (AL 100928-01)

- b) Q: *khím* *nàŋla làp-pa*
 house inside say-PST
 'did [you] say inside the house [is where it is used]?'
 (AL 091108-01 14:47)

A: *khím* *nàŋla kò-gandi* *sè*
 house inside need-NOM thing
 'it is a thing you need inside the house.' (SL 091108-01 14:49)

Hari (2010:104) mention the suffix *-pa/-ba* in Melamchi Valley Yolmo, and notes that with rising intonation it is used for past tense questions. There is a cognate question marker in Standard Tibetan, which has the allomorphs *-pas/-gas* in the

examples in (2) and (3) from Garrett (2001). In Lamjung Yolmo the *-pa* suffix can, and is often, used for non-interrogative past tense marking of declarative utterances, as demonstrated in examples (10) below, taken from the Family Story.

- 10)a) *òole* *ɲà* *phíla* *kàl-di* *làŋ-tile* *tá-pa*
 and.then 1SG outside go.PERF-PERFstand-after look-PST
 ‘and then I went outside, after standing (I) looked’
 (SBL 101124-03 33:29)

- b) *khó=ki* *tínla* *tèmba sàl-pa*
 3SG.M=ERG after remember-PST
 ‘after, he remembered.’ (SBL 101124-03 8:44)

The egophoric identification copula *yimba* no longer has an unsuffixed equivalent, and has no tense associated with its use in Lamjung Yolmo. The egophoric equational *yèba* and the perceptual evidential *dùba* can be used interrogatively, although there are many instances where their use is clearly non-interrogative.

It is possible to ask a question without using the *-pa* suffix on a lexical verb; instead the appropriate tense/aspect marking is used. In (11a) KL is looking at a photograph of an optical illusion by Ukrainian artist Oleg Shuplyak, which is simultaneously a face self-portrait and a landscape with the figure of a painter in the foreground. KL is unsure how to describe the image, and turns to her older sister ST (who had already seen the image) to ask what she should say. In (11b) ST is talking to her mother while they work, making woven bamboo baskets. ST is using a large knife to shave a strip of bamboo thinner, she then holds it up to inspect, and asks her mother (11b), seeing confirmation that the task is completed satisfactorily. Her mother stops her work and turns to acknowledge the question, even though she does not respond verbally, ST continues to inspect and shave the bamboo.

- 11) a) *tɕí ləp-ke ná*
 what say-PRES SUP
 ‘what should I say?’ (KL 120304-02 6:36)
- b) *dí kàl-sin*
 this go.PST-PST
 ‘is this done?’ (ST 120305-01 6:11)

Example (11a) also demonstrates that speakers can add a particle to a question. Common particles to appear in question constructions are *ná* which has a suppositional sense, and *lée* which is more conciliatory in tone (12).

- 12) KL: *tɕí yimba tɕí yimba lée*
 what COP.EGO what COP.EGO PART
 ‘what is it? What is it?’ (KL 120304-02 00:38)

Hari (2010:97) describes the function of *lée* as ‘mitigating’ or ‘pleading’, and it has a function of trying to convince the interlocutor. When used in declaratives the speaker is generally trying to convince their addressee of the truth value of their utterance. The *lée* particle often occurs in combination with *ná*, but can also appear alone.

ná and *lée* also occur in declarative and imperative utterances, where they have a mitigating effect on the strength of the proposition or request (13).

- 13) *sò ná lée*
 eat.IMP SUP PART
 ‘please eat.’ (AL 101005-01)

These particles are used in framing a question, and they are not used in the answer to that question. Unlike the evidential or epistemic value of the question, which is oriented to the addressee, the value of the particle marks the question-asker’s attitude towards asking the question, for example with *ná* that they are

not entirely confident about asking the question, or with /ée they are framing a request.

The reported speech particle can be used as a question-asking strategy, with the inclusion of an interrogative pronoun. The most common construction of this type is equivalent to English ‘what did (you/they) say?’ (14)

- 14) tɕí ló
 what RS
 ‘what (did you say?)’ (RL 101120-01)

The phrase can also mean ‘what to say?’ when a person is lost for words. In declarative uses of the reported speech particle, the person using the particle is most typically reporting the speech of one person to another audience; with questions, the reported speech particle could be in reference to a third person, but it can also be directed at the addressee. In some contexts the phrase tɕí ló can also be directed back to the speaker themselves (see §4.2).

So far I have generally demonstrated the structure of questions and answers in Lamjung Yolmo using full sentences. Obviously, in conversation people do not always speak in full sentences, and in the following sections on specific sentence types we will see many shorter utterances that fulfil the role of question or answer. As Fox and Thompson (2010) and Thompson et al. (2015) note, shorter answers are not necessarily a form of ellipsis where the shorter answers are truncated versions of longer possible answers. Short responses, and short questions, are often more appropriate in interactional context; as Heritage and Raymond (2012:184) note, “little questions get little answers”. Sometimes these shorter questions or answers do not include an evidential form, I discuss this in the relevant sections of each question type below.

3.3 Polar questions

Polar question structures are those where the expected answer is a choice of affirmative or negative. They are also known as yes-no (Sadock and Zwicky, 1985) or binary questions.

A polar question can be asked with rising intonation (15). The expected answer to this is to either reply in the affirmative (15a), or the negative (15b):

15)Q: *khé nàl-sin*
 2SG sleep-PST
 ‘did you sleep?’ (AL 100928-01)

A: a) *ηà nàl-sin*
 1SG sleep-PST
 ‘I slept.’ (AL 100928-01)

b) *ηà mà-nàl*
 2SG NEG.PST-sleep
 ‘I did not sleep.’ (AL 100928-01)

Polar questions do not always have to be asked in the affirmative; it is also possible to pose polar questions in the negative. In the examples below we see that in the twenty questions game speakers would often ask questions in the negative (16):

16)a) Q: *tòŋbo=ki mìn*
 tree=GEN COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘is it not something from a tree?’ (RL 101120-02 08:15)

A: *mìn*
 COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘it is not.’ (SNL 101120-02 08:16)

b) Q: *mèndza mìn*
 bowl COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘is it not a bowl?’ (AL 120214-02 01:57)

A: *mìn*

COP.EGO.NEG

'it is not.' (SL 120214-02 01:59)

This use of the negative would usually not occur early in the round of the game. After a person had received a number of negative responses to their question it appeared they oriented more towards the negative response that they had come to expect as the answer. As Sadock and Zwicky (1985:180) note, when it comes to polarity bias, speaker responses most frequently conform to the constraints set up by the previous turn. Here, the question-asker appears to have oriented to asking negative bias polar questions after receiving a string of negative responses to affirmative biased questions. This is a feature of type conformity at work, but for polarity, rather than for the evidential value.

Polar questions can be asked without a copula form; in the same round of twenty questions as (16b), before she starts using the strategy of asking with a negative copula, AL asks questions by just using the noun and rising intonation (17a). Example (17b) illustrates the same strategy being used in RL and SNL's game of twenty questions.

17) a) Q: *kwèla*
 clothing
 'clothing?' (AL 101120-02 01:49)

A: *min*
 COP.EGO.NEG
 'no.' (SL 101120-02 01:51)

b) Q: *làgor*
 millstone
 'a millstone?' (RL 101120-02 07:14)

A: *mìn*
 COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘no’ (SNL 101120-02 07:15)

Even though there is no evidential form in the question, SL and SNL’s answers are framed with the egophoric form that has been the basis of the questions and answers so far in the game.

3.4 Alternative questions

Alternative questions give two or more alternatives, distinguishing them from polar questions, which only frame a binary option (Stivers and Enfield 2010; Sadock and Zwicky 1985).

One possible alternative question structure is to include both the affirmative and negative polarities of the verb. When doing this, speakers do not include any tense marking on the affirmative form, and use the either the past or non-past negation marker where appropriate (18).

18)a) Q: *sà* *mè-sà* *yè*
 eat NEG.NON.PST-eat COP.EGO
 ‘(do you) eat (it) or not eat it?’ (RL 101120-02 06:32)

A: *mè-sà* *yè*
 NEG.PST-eat COP.EGO
 ‘don’t eat (it).’ (SNL 101120-02 06:33)

b) Q: *tó* *sà* *mà-sà*
 rice eat NEG.PST-eat
 ‘did (you) eat rice or not?’ (RL 120220-02)

A: *mà-sà* *yè*
 NEG.PST-eat COP.EGO
 ‘(I) didn’t eat’ (RL 120220-02)

As can be seen from (18b), the question may omit the copula, and thus any evidential information, but even then the addressee has still supplied the copula in his answer.

When the two polarities are expressed with the egophoric identification affirmative and negative copulas *yimba* and *mìn*, one of the *yimba/mìn* pair is often modified so that the forms are parallel. In (19a) the form *yimba* is reduced to *yìn* to match the negative polarity *mìn* in the question, but is expressed in full in the answer.¹² In (19b) we see the negative form become *mimba* to match the affirmative polarity. The forms *yìn* and *mimba* only occur in these twin copula polar question structures. Note that the question in (19a) is a tag question, which is also a possible alternative question structure.

19)a) Q: *òolegi* *khó=ki* *jà* *sà-ni*
 and.then 3SG.M=GEN fish eat-FOC
 bitça *pè-sin*
 think(Nep) do-PST
 yìn *mìn*
 COP.EGO COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘and then he thinks about eating the fish, is it or not?’
 (RL 101027-02 02:57)

A: *yimba*
 COP.EGO
 ‘it is.’ (SUL 101027-02 03:01)

b) Q: *sàse yimba* *kí* *mimba*
 food COP.EGO or COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘does it eat food or not’ (AL 120214-02 15:50)

¹² /n/ does not always assimilate to /m/ before bilabials in productive uses of the -pa suffix in nouns. Hari (2010:58) notes that *yimba* is a possible variant of the copula, along with *yìn* and *yìngen* in that variety.

A: *mìn*
 COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘it doesn’t’ (SL 120214-02 15:51)

A common alternative question structure in the corpus is __ *yimba* (*ná*) *kí* __ *yimba*. This use of the egophoric copula with the suppositional particle *ná* and conjunction *kí* ‘or’ creates a coordination that requests the interlocutor suggest the more likely option (20a). Frequently, the second coordination slot will not be filled, but left open, as in (20b). Questions asked with this unfinished construction have more of a hedging stance, and almost always include the supposition particle. This construction only occurs with the egophoric equative copula in my corpus. Note that in (20a) ST answers using a perceptual evidential; the use of *límu* ‘like’ always takes a perceptual evidential. In this example there is an evidential mismatch between the question and answer, which I discuss in (§4.1) below.

20) a) Q: *dì khím yimba kí tòṅbo yimba*
 this house COP.EGO or tree COP.EGO
 ‘is this a house, or a tree?’ (AL 091108-01 2:23)

A: *tòṅbo límu dù*
 tree like COP.PE
 ‘it looks like a tree.’ (SL 091108-01 2:28)

b) Q: *mewa yimba ná kí*
 papaya(Nep) COP.EGO SUP or
 ‘it might be a papaya or...?’ (AL 091108-01 11:12)

A: *nariwal*
 Coconut(Nep)
 ‘a coconut.’ (ST 091108-01 11:13)

3.5 Content questions

The final question type I discuss are content questions, also known as information questions (Sadock and Zwicky, 1985), Q-word questions (Stivers and Enfield, 2010), or ‘wh-questions’ in English-centric terminology (Sadock, 2012:103). Unlike polar question structures discussed above, content questions use interrogative pronouns, which allows for a wider range of answers as they are asking for a reply that includes content other than an affirmation or rejection of the proposition in the question. There is a closed set of interrogative pronouns in Lamjung Yolmo (21).

21)	<i>sú</i>	‘who’
	<i>nàm</i>	‘when’
	<i>kàla</i>	‘where’
	<i>tɕípe</i>	‘why’
	<i>tɕí</i>	‘what’
	<i>kàndi</i>	‘which’
	<i>kànmu</i>	‘how’ (attribute)
	<i>kàn pèdi</i>	‘how’ (mode)
	<i>kànɕa</i>	‘how’ (mode) ¹³
	<i>kàze</i>	‘how many’

The interrogative pronouns occur in the syntactic structure where the relevant answer content would occur, as you can see from questions with a variety of interrogative pronouns in (22). Note that there is some elision in the answers, which I discuss below, and question (22c) received no answer.

22)	a)	Q:	<i>táŋa</i>	<i>kàla yè</i>
			money	where COP.EGO
			‘where is the money?’ (LG 120304-01 11:12)	

¹³ The two ‘how’ (mode) forms are preferenced by different speakers but are both understood by all. They are based on different structures; *kàn pèdi* uses the verb *pè-* ‘do’ while *kànɕa* is analogous to *dènɕa* ‘in this way’.

A: *kàlda=la yè*
 bag=LOC COP.EGO
 'in the bag.' (ST 120304-01 11:13)

b) Q: *dì tǽí yimba*
 this what COP.EGO
 'what is this?' (AL 091108-01 01:14)

A: *màgi yimba*
 corn COP.EGO
 'this is corn' (AL 091108-01 01:14)

c) Q: *náma sú yimba*
 brothers.wife who COP.EGO
 'who is my sister in law?' (SBL 101124-03 10:55)

As with other question structures, there is a tendency towards shorter questions and answers in conversation. The question form often has an omitted subject, which also occurs frequently in declarative sentences. The answer form can often just be the content requested in the interrogative pronoun of the question, as in (23).

23) Q: *dì tǽí yimba*
 this what COP.EGO
 'what is this?' (AL 091108-01 04:51)

A: *phársi*
 pumpkin(Nep)
 'pumpkin' (SL 091108-01 04:52)

In naturalistic speech the omission of the copula is common, both in declarative and interrogative contexts. In (24) from the Family Story, SBL is telling the story

in first person and asks and then answers his own question without the use of a copula.

24) Q: *òodi=le pàrkila tçi*
 that=ABL between what
 ‘from that, what is in between [those events]?’
 (SBL 101124-03 25:40)

A: *tcháuki=la qò-ke gàrila*
 Barracks(Nep)=DAT go-NON.PST at.the.time
 ‘that time when I went to the barracks.’ (SBL 101124-03 25:42)

It is also possible, with in certain contexts context, for the question to be reduced to only the interrogative pronoun with a rising intonation, and for the answer to mirror it with the appropriate content. In (25) AL is moving cards from the Family Story around and asks and answers her own question.

25) Q: *kàla*
 where
 ‘where (should this card go)?’ (AL 091108-01 28:45)

A: *dàla*
 here
 ‘(it should go) here.’ (AL 091108-01 28:49)

These smaller question and answer structures are why I opt to use elicited question-answer pairs to demonstrate some of the basic syntactic features of these forms at the start of this section. It is also worth remembering that this is a feature of interactional language use in Lamjung Yolmo, because it means that even if people *can* express the anticipated evidential in a question, they often do not, in much the same way that people can ask questions using non-evidential structures. It is unclear if using shorter questions or non-evidential forms are strategies that can be used to avoid having to anticipate someone’s

evidential source, and is not something I have readily noticed (although it is a strategy I use as a second-language speaker). It is worth recalling, though, that the discussion in §4 is really a discussion about a subset of question and answer interactions that have evidential values, and not all interrogative usage.

4. Asking questions and giving answers

In the section above I outlined the structural features of questions and answers in Lamjung Yolmo. A sub-set of questions involve the use of an evidential form, and the evidential value should relate to the addressee's perceived knowledge state. In this section I look at how the anticipation of addressee knowledge state plays out in interaction (§4.1). I also look specifically at self-answered questions in Lamjung Yolmo (§4.2). Self-answered questions offer a different perspective on the anticipation rule as the same person is asking and answering the question

4.1 Questions predicting answers

Example (26) shows two question-answer pairs in picture-based tasks where the people asking the questions frame them with different evidentials.

26) a) Q: *gàrden=la ná kí tǎí yimba ná*
 garden(Eng)=LOC SUP or what COP.EGO SUP
 'it is in the garden, or what is it?' (AL 091108-01 10:58)

A: *phíla yimba yíldo=la*
 outside COP.EGO courtyard=LOC
 'it is outside, in the courtyard.' (SL 091108-01 10:59)

b) Q: *nàŋla tǎí dù léé*
 inside what COP.PE PART
 'what is inside [the picture]?' (ST 120304-02 07:34)

A: *dàla tòŋbo dũ*
 here tree COP.PE
 ‘(there) is a tree here.’ (CL 120304-02 07:36)

In (26a) AL uses a construction with the egophoric copula during the Family Story task because she is anticipating that SL has more knowledge about the location of the people in the image, and can reply with the egophoric and help build the story. At this point AL and SL have already seen all of the images, and are negotiating and arranging them in a way that makes a story. In (26b) ST is assisting with the administration of the optical illusion task. CL is looking at a photorealistic painting of a bird sitting on a branch next to some leaves that look like a bird. ST is attempting to prompt a description of this image, as it’s the first time CL has seen it. By using the perceptual evidential, she is asking the speaker to focus on what he can see in the image. These examples demonstrate that the choice between egophoric and perceptual evidential forms is not always dependent on context, but sometimes on the grammatical structures the speaker prefers to use in a given turn in the interaction.

To give an observed example of the anticipatory structure in daily life, KL is in the cooking area of her house, around a corner from the bathroom. One of her children is about to enter the bathroom, but cannot find the plastic sandals that are used for the wet room, and so walks back into the kitchen area to put on her own sandals. KL then asks the child (27).

27) Q: *tɛápal mĩndu*
 sandals COP.PE.NEG
 ‘are the sandals not there?’ (KL 02/02/2011 book 8:11)

A: *mĩndu*
 COP.PE.NEG
 ‘they are not’ (NKL 02/02/2011 book 8:11)

KL cannot see the room, and has no perceptual evidence of whether the sandals are there. She is using the perceptual evidential form on the

assumption that the child has already looked for the sandals, and would reply with a perceptual evidential copula. She replies using the perceptual evidential.

Across most interactions it appears that while asking questions, speakers of Lamjung Yolmo rely on expected answer patterns based on the semantics of the copulas available and general knowledge-state tendencies. The semantics of the choices available influence this process, as does the general understanding of the likely knowledge state of a person directly or indirectly involved in an event. These expectations are why we find, for example, a common pragmatic relationship between certain copulas and grammatical person in subjects. For example, questions about first-person subjects will *generally* be answered with an egophoric form because a speaker is most likely to have personal knowledge of their own states and actions.

There are relatively few copula choices to be made; presuming that the person you are talking to is not going to be answering the question using the dubitative forms, or use the infrequent general fact copula, it is usually a matter of choice between the perceptual evidential and the egophoric, which are not entirely exclusive in their semantic or contextual distribution, but there are contexts in which one is clearly the preferred form, such as egophoric for first person subject utterances.

The clearest way to demonstrate that speakers usually rely on predictable patterns is to find examples where these patterns are not followed, either by the person asking the question or the person answering.

An uncommon copula choice in a question construction can indicate that in at least some interactions the questioner is taking into account a specific individual's knowledge state, rather than relying on general expectations. The exchange in (28) occurred between KL and her older sister ST during the hidden object task. KL was at the first stage, where the objects are covered and can only be guessed at by looking at the shape of the item hidden under the cloth, and unsurprisingly was finding it difficult to make any guesses. She expressed this overtly (28a). Her sister then asked her what the items are, using the dubitative copula (28b). KL responded by restating the question, and then made an attempt to guess what the object might be (with no overt copula) (28c).

28) a) KL: *tɕí yimba tɕí yimba lée*
 what COP.EGO what COP.EGO PART
ŋà mè-ɕée dù lée
 1SG NEG.NON.PST-know COP.PE PART
 ‘what is it? What is it? I don’t know.’ (KL 120304-02 00:38)

b) ST (Q) *tɕí yèto òola*
 what COP.DUB there
 ‘what is it probably?’ (ST 120304-02 00:42)

c) KL (A) *òodí yèto tɕí làp-ke*
 that COP.DUB what say-NON.PST
píza tsá-kandí sè
 child play-NOM thing
 ‘that might be? What to say? A children’s toy.’
 (KL 120304-02 00:47)

This example shows that the speaker is not just using a default assumption as to what knowledge her interlocutor might have. Instead, she uses the dubitative copula in a question, which is a very uncommon construction in the corpus. In this context ST has observed that KL is uncertain as to what is being hidden under the cloth, and having already done the task is aware of how, in this context, it is difficult to guess what it might be. Instead of using the egophoric form, she instead chooses to use the dubitative, indicating to her interlocutor that she is not expecting an answer with complete certainty, but one marked with the dubitative copula. ST’s use of the dubitative indicates that within the interaction she is able to use the contextual cues and KL’s behavior to model how she thinks KL’s answer will most likely be marked.

Much more commonly found in the corpus are situations where a person asks a question using a form that would be an acceptable default, and the person replying uses a different copula in their response. Although a question anticipates a particular evidential in an answer, the addressee is not constrained to only answering using that evidential, or answering at all. A

mismatched evidential in a question and answer adjacency pair may indicate that answerer does not believe the evidential in the question is appropriate for their current knowledge state. It also indicates that the question-asker may be using an evidential value that is anticipated based on a general expectation, rather than anticipating how the addressee chooses to mark their knowledge state at this particular point in the interaction.

Examples (29) and (30) are an elicited pair that I discussed in detail with RL. The question in (29) is what one person would ask another person if they came across something foreign like a digital audio-recorder. Like many of the examples above, the egophoric copula is used, because ideally your interlocutor would know what the device is.

- 29) *dì* *phón* *yimba*
 this phone(Eng) COP.EGO
 ‘is this a phone?’ (RL 120220-03)

Asking a question with an egophoric like this would be appropriate in a context where you expected or hoped that your interlocutor would know what the device was, but if the person answering the question were equally unsure then it would not be appropriate to reply using the egophoric form, and instead they would be more likely to say something like (30) in response.

- 30) *dì* *phón* *yinqo*
 this phone(Eng) COP.DUB
 ‘this is maybe a phone’ (RL 120220-03)

Occasionally there can be a mismatch in question and answer because the two speakers are using different syntactic frames, which preference different evidentials. Example (31) below was given as (20a) in §3.4. In the question, AL is using the alternative question frame “is it a house, or is it a tree”. In the corpus I have, this coordination always uses the egophoric *yimba* and to date I have no examples with *dú*. SL answers using a construction with *límu* ‘like’. To

say that something is like something else is highlight direct perceptual evidence, and so constructions of this type always occur with a perceptual evidential.

31) Q: *dì khím yimba kí tònbo yimba*
 this house COP.EGO or tree COP.EGO
 'is this a house, or a tree?' (AL 091108-01 2:23)

A: *tònbo límu dù*
 tree like COP.PE
 'it looks like a tree.' (SL 091108-01 2:26)

tònbo límu dù
 tree like COP.PE
 'it looks like a tree.' (AL 091108-01 2:28)

Using a different grammatical structure required SL to draw on a different evidential strategy. This was immediately echoed by AL, and the discussion moved on, indicating that AL accepted SL's answer.

In the twenty questions game, the person asking questions would almost always frame questions using the egophoric. The motivation for this choice appears to be the fact that they were asking questions about an item the addressee was familiar with. The other person would respond with an egophoric copula, if overt copulas were used at all. At one point in the game, SL decided to use the perceptual evidential (32) in her question instead of the ego.

32) Q: *chulo mĩndu*
 fireplace(Nep) COP.PE.NEG
 'a fireplace?' (SL 120214-02 13:23)

A: *mĩn*
 COP.EGO.NEG
 'is not.' (AL 120214-02 13:24)

It is possible that this was done to break up the pattern of egophoric copulas that are usually used in the twenty questions game, as it occurs at a point over 10 minutes into playing the game. It is also possible that it was a strategy where she was asking AL to attend to the specific image, rather than just her knowledge (by evoking the specificity of direct sight the perceptual evidential encodes). There was no observable pause or hesitation between the two utterances, and neither speaker appeared to indicate that the framing of the question with a different evidential was infelicitous or embarrassing in any way. Aikhenvald notes that Tariana (Arawak) and Tucano (East Tucanoan) both have anticipatory evidentials in questions. She notes this is a potentially complex and threatening interactional situation as “a question may sound like an accusation if the addressee turns out to have a different information source from what the speaker has thought it to be” (Aikhenvald 2004:342). This does not appear to be the case in Lamjung Yolmo. To date I have no examples of situations where a person has responded in a way that indicates displeasure with the evidential used in a question. As Brown (2010:2633) notes in her discussion of epistemic mismatches in Tzeltal, it appears to be more of a problem for analysts than participants when these epistemic mismatches arise.

Questions with copulas are asked using a general understanding of which evidential is most appropriate for a particular context. However, speakers can also take into account the specifics of the interaction, and model the knowledge state of their interlocutor to ask questions that are based more specifically on likely knowledge state. When asked a question, a speaker is not constrained to only answer with the copula form in the question. Instead the person can use a different copula in an answer, with no apparent disruption to the interaction

This anticipation rule may provide a possible mechanism for first language acquisition of evidentiality by children. The examples in (33) both feature RL asking questions of a group of children (4 male children aged 4-5) while he is telling them the Jackal and Crow story using picture cards. RL already saw the story cards earlier that day, and is familiar with the tale. In (19), given again as (33a) below, RL uses an egophoric, which he would expect in

the answer as perceptual evidentials are typical unsuitable for the internal cognitive processes of others.¹⁴ In (33b) from the same retelling of the story, RL used a perceptual evidential in forming a question while he is showing an image where the children can clearly see the fish in the jackal's mouth. At these different parts of the story RL anticipates the different copula forms his young interlocutors will answer with.

33) a) Q: *òolegi khó=ki nà sà-ni*
and.then 3SG.M=GEN fish eat-FOC
bitça pè-sin yìn mìn
think(Nep) do-PST COP.EGO COP.EGO.NEG
'and then he thinks about eating the fish, is it or not?'
(RL 101027-02 02:57)

A: *yimba*
COP.EGO
'it is.' (SUL 101027-02 03:01)

b) Q: *tçàro=ki tçhódo=la nà dù mĩndu*
crow=GEN lip=LOC fish COP.PE COP.PE.NEG
'is there or is there not a fish in the crow's mouth?'
(RL 101027-02 02:01)

A: *dù*
COP.PE
'(there) is.' (SUL 101027-02 02:03)

Once children become aware of the mechanisms of the anticipation rule, they know how to answer a question in a way that interlocutors consider contextually appropriate with regards to the felicity of the evidential form. The children in this

¹⁴ This evidential divide is well-attested in Tibetic languages and internal states are known as endopathic in the literature (see Tournadre and Dorje, 2003:167).

recording were all aged around 5. By this age, de Villiers et al., (2009) and de Villiers and Garfield (2009) demonstrate that children who speak Standard Tibetan are using most evidential forms correctly, and are able to reliably use the appropriate evidential to form a question themselves. At an earlier stage of development de Villiers et al. (2009) demonstrate that Standard Tibetan-speaking children start using the perceptual evidential from around 2-3 years of age, but more as a marker of epistemic certainty than evidentiality. Of course, children can acquire evidential languages that do not have an anticipation rule in questions, and I am not arguing that this would be a sole acquisition strategy, however it may play a role. A targeted child language acquisition corpus would need to be built to test this hypothesis. A well-designed corpus would provide a more detailed understanding of evidential acquisition in children. Such a corpus would also need to attend to language use around the child as their language develops. As the anticipation rule partly functions based on answers expected by convention, this gives children an opportunity to observe what forms are expected in certain contexts. Thus, the anticipation rule may provide one avenue for evidential acquisition.

4.2 Self-answered questions

The examples I have looked at so far involve at least two different people: one person who asks the question and the other who answers it, usually with an intention of aligning knowledge states between the two parties. In this section I explore what happens when a person takes on the role of both question asker and answerer. Self-answered questions are different to questions asked of another person, because one is not interrogating the knowledge state of another person (San Roque et al., 2015:12-13). In Lamjung Yolmo these self-answered questions appear to have a different pattern of evidential distribution in comparison to questions and answers between two parties.

Levinson (1988:181) proposes a functional category of speech he calls 'outlouds'. This utterance type is not limited to questions, but can also be statements and exclamations. Levinson (1988:181) argues that for outlouds "there is no recipient, unless someone elects himself, such utterances being

designed to make possible, but not to presuppose, the existence of a possible set of addressees or audience.” They can therefore serve a function of initiating an interaction in a way that does not require the speaker to take a stronger action, and sometimes may have a target in mind, even if they are not directly addressed. In their cross-linguistic survey of questions in interaction, Stivers and Enfield (2010) include outlouds as a possible functional category, observing that they occur when a question does not appear to be delivered to a particular addressee or set of addressees. Interactional features that indicate this can include the question being asked at a lower volume (Stivers and Enfield, 2010:2623). Of the ten languages in their survey, outlouds are discussed in the papers on Danish (Heinemann, 2010:2717) and Yélî Dnye (Levinson, 2010:2750). In both of these papers the authors note that gaze is also a useful cue for identifying outlouds, as the speaker gaze will often not be directed at any specific individual in the interaction.

I also identify outlouds as questions where there is no other party that the question is specifically addressed to, and there is some additional cue, such as gaze away from other people or sotto voce. Although there is no addressee specified, another person may choose to answer the question in an outloud. Often the speaker will answer the question, maintaining the same gaze or sotto voce that was used in asking the question. Alternatively, it is possible that no one will answer the question. As outlouds are not directed at a specific other addressee, when people ask questions in the outloud style and answer these questions themselves, I refer to these as ‘self-answered’ questions. This is not to say that they must answer these questions themselves, only that they choose to not direct these questions at some other specific individual, and in these cases the speaker chooses to also take the next turn, answering their own question.

In the corpus there are many examples of self-answered questions being asked using an egophoric evidential. While the question is asked with the egophoric, the answer is often given using a perceptual evidential. To begin with an elicited example discussed in detail with RL, if a person is searching for their mobile phone in their pockets, unsure of where they left it, (34) would be the appropriate question to ask themselves as they are searching.

- 34) *ɲà=ki* *fón* *kàla* *yè*
 1SG=GEN phone(Eng) where COP.EGO
 ‘where is my phone?’ (RL 120220-03)

Regardless of whether a person was alone in a room and asking this of herself, or with a second person, the egophoric copula is the preferred choice. RL’s reasoning for using the egophoric when asking a question like this of another person is that there is an expectation that any interlocutor would ideally know without the need to see the phone. Even when asking as an outloud without another person as addressee in the room, the egophoric is the preferred form, according to RL. When the phone is eventually found, (35) would be an appropriate exclamation.

- 35) *dèla* *dù*
 here COP.PE
 ‘it is here.’ (RL 120220-03)

In the response, the perceptual evidential is used because the speaker has direct perceptual evidence of the location of the phone. The use of a perceptual evidential in response to an outloud question framed with an egophoric is not uncommon in the corpus.

Thus, while the question was asked it was directed at someone with established knowledge, and when finding the item it is appropriate to reflect your actual knowledge state. This is quite different to questions directed at a specific addressee, where the evidential used in the question and the answer are far more likely to be the same. It is possible that in outlouds, where there’s no specific addressee whose knowledge state can be anticipated, the egophoric is acting as a default form for questions, unless there is overwhelmingly strong contextual motivation for using the perceptual evidential. Alternatively, in the absence of a specific addressee, the egophoric is anticipated as some kind of idealized knowledge state, where the speaker would already know the answer. In (35), the speaker could only answer their own outloud when they had visual

evidence of the location of the phone, because if they already had knowledge of the location of the phone they would not have to ask the question.

Looking at examples from the structured elicitation tasks, speakers across many activities use the egophoric evidential when they are asking a question as an outloud, often while considering how to describe an image or perform one of the structured tasks (36). While watching one of the Put Project videos (Bowerman et al., 2004), where a person pulls a small item from a hole at the base of a tree, AL is unsure what the item is. She observes that the action was performed (hence her use of the perceptual evidential for the action), but, unsure of what the item is, she asks herself what it could be. The lack of separation from the rest of the utterance, and the fact that she did not shift her gaze to anyone else in the room indicates that the question was not for another person to answer. The interrogative component of the sentence is the phrase *tɕí yimba ná tɕí*, which is part of a larger utterance that includes a perceptual evidential. Therefore, it does not appear impossible for speakers to include a perceptual evidential as part of a self-answered interrogative, although the interrogative component does include an egophoric, which as discussed above is the general preference.

- 36) *tònbo dàg=ki* *tòlbo nàŋla=le* *tɕí* *yimba ná*
 tree base=GEN hole inside=ABL what COP.EGO SUP
 tɕí *tén-ku* *dù*
 what pull.out-IPFV AUX.PE
 ‘from the tree base’s hole what is it (the person) pulls out?’
 (AL 101006-01 1:04:35)

In (36) AL does not answer the question that she has posed for herself, but moves on to describe the rest of the video, leaving the identity of the object unresolved.

Example (37a) comes from the Family Story and demonstrates speakers indicating their uncertainty about what a feature of the image is, before answering their own question. Here AL is using the *límu* ‘like’ construction in her answer, and so uses a perceptual evidential. Example (37b) is from the hidden

objects task, as KL starts to touch the spectacles hidden under the cloth and then figures out what they are a moment later.

37) a) Q: *khí tǎí yimba ná kí tǎí yimba*
 dog what COP.EGO SUP or what COP.EGO
 ‘a dog... what is it, or what is it?’ (AL 101010-01 03:11)

A: *khí límu dù*
 dog like COP.PE
 ‘it is like a dog.’ (AL 101010-01 03:13)

b) Q: *dì tǎí yimba*
 this what COP.EGO
 ‘what is this?’ (KL 120304-02 03:48)

A: *dì-ní tsasma dùba lée*
 this-FOC glasses(Nep) COP.PE.EMPH PART
 ‘these are glasses.’ (KL 120304-02 03:49)

The speaker asks the question with an egophoric, either as a default or directed at some unspecified person with an idealised knowledge state, but when they come to answer their own question the most appropriate evidential to use is the perceptual, having just used some form of evidence to come to a conclusion about their answer. Either way, the person to whom the question is being directed has a different knowledge state from the speaker, as can be seen from the different choice of copulas in the interrogative and declarative forms.

This pattern of asking outloud questions with an egophoric and self-answering them with a perceptual is different to the pattern we have seen in this paper so far when a question is directed at a specific interlocutor. It does not mean that this is the only possible pattern. In a recording of the Family Story task (38), AL is looking at one of the images early on, and uses an egophoric in her question, and in the answer that she gives immediately afterward:

38) Q: *dì tǎí yimba*
 this what COP.EGO
 ‘what is this?’ (AL 091108-01 01:14)

A: *màgi yimba*
 corn COP.EGO
 ‘this is corn’ (AL 091108-01 01:14)

It is not immediately obvious from the context what made AL feel that it was appropriate to answer a question with the egophoric. Perhaps outlouds are sometimes used as interactional filler, or commentary on the task at hand, and AL actually felt certain enough that it was corn to use the egophoric, without the perceptual evidential to mark visual information. Just as we saw it was possible for an addressee to answer a question with a different evidential to the one used in the question, outlouds do not prevent the answer from being given using any evidential.

A common outloud with interrogative semantics is the phrase *tǎí ló*, which in such a context means ‘what to say’, rather than ‘what did you/they say’ as it was introduced in example 14 (§3.2). This phrase often functions as a discourse filler for a speaker. A question asked with a reported speech evidential in a multi-speaker interaction would anticipate a reported speech particle framing the reported speech content in the answer; the use of a reported speech particle in an outloud self-answered question is never used in the next utterance. Example (39) is two lines from ST discussing how to make a curry, while she prepares it. The question is asked, but the response is to move on to the next step and request the coriander that is needed.

39) *tǎí ló*
 what RS
 ‘what to say?’ (ST 120307-01 00:52)

né-na-ni *dhaniyā*
 pass-CON-FOC coriander(Nep)
 ‘if you pass the coriander...’ (ST 120307-01 00:54)

Self-answered questions differ from other questions as they do not fit the usual pattern of interaction that requires a speaker and addressee. Speakers are willing to answer their own outloud interrogatives, but often there is a change in their knowledge state between framing the question and answering it; they have found their phone, or figured out what is hiding under the cloth. This appears to be the motivation for the shift in evidential between question and answer, which occurs much less commonly in multiparty question-answer adjacency pairs. What is not clear from the Lamjung Yolmo data is why the egophoric is preferred as the evidential value in these outloud questions. I have raised two possibilities. The first is that the anticipatory nature of the evidential in questions breaks down and the egophoric is used as a default, the second is that the evidential in the question still anticipates the best evidential for the context, and in most contexts where the speaker is not directing the question at a specific individual and their specific knowledge state, the ideal knowledge would be that which is already held by the speaker, rather than direct perception.

5. Conclusion

I have framed the analysis of Lamjung Yolmo around Tournadre and LaPolla’s (2015) ‘anticipation rule’ for Tibetic languages. The question-asker attempts to align the evidential in the question to their interlocutor’s knowledge state as a grammatical feature of questions. The choice of evidential to use is, in part, based on general knowledge of the semantic distribution of these evidential forms, but also on tracking interlocutor knowledge state in a specific interaction. Even then, the person answering is not obliged to answer using the evidential form in the question, and will often use one that they feel is more appropriate for their knowledge state. Also relevant is Raymond’s (2003) discussion of type-conformity. The evidential used in the question, and the other information framed in the question, inevitably restrict the likely set of answers the person

replying can give. By extension, if the question is asked using a yes/no polar option that is encoded in the egophoric, then a type-conforming answer would be in the egophoric. As we saw in this paper, it does not prevent the interlocutor from using another evidential value in the response. Although speakers can choose to not answer a question, or answer with a non-preferred structure or evidential value, it is clear that the question asking and question answering are closely connected in the interaction.

As I discussed in the broader literature, it is unlikely that this anticipation rule is particular to Tibetic languages, or to evidential constructions, but is part of a larger trait in a diverse set of languages to orient to the evidential and epistemic status of the addressee in question structures. The study of this phenomena cross-linguistically can be enriched with some simple improvements in language documentation processes. The most obvious of these is to ensure that the description of question structures includes question-answer pairs taken from naturalistic interaction. Providing questions and answers drawn from non-elicited data will also ensure a fuller picture of possible answers and possible questions. As I have shown in this paper, open-structure interactional tasks can provide a wealth of question and answer data, and make it easier to track reference and knowledge state than sometimes is possible in spontaneous conversation. Drawing on child-language corpora may also help identify whether the anticipation rule may also be used as one pathway to evidential acquisition in children.

Richer cross-linguistic data for the anticipatory evidential structures needs to also include examples of where there is a misalignment between the evidential used in the question and the answer. Drawing on languages with evidential systems that show different semantic distribution and pragmatic tendencies than those of the Tibetic languages may also help shed new light on what interactional cues speakers are using to form questions that best anticipate their interlocutors' answers. For example, it would be interesting to see if speakers of a language with both a visual and non-visual evidential category (Aikhenvald 2015:241) are more likely to anticipate visual information over other sensory information. Lamjung Yolmo has a relatively small set of possible forms the question-asker can encode in their question; the general fact

copula is almost never used in interaction, and the dubitative is used infrequently in questions as it is unusual to ask a question of someone who is unsure of something (but not impossible, as we saw in example 28). Therefore, speakers are only likely to have to choose between the perceptual and egophoric, both of which have quite broad application. Anticipatory evidentials in questions are not constrained to languages with a small number of evidential distinctions; Tariana has five evidential categories: visual, non-visual sensory, inferred, assumed and reported (Aikhenvald 2004:60) and also demonstrates question structures that anticipate the evidential used in the answer.

Tracking interlocutors evidential status in interaction is a complex cognitive process that demonstrates the social nature of language use (Enfield and Levinson, 2006). In this paper I also looked at a type of question I referred to as 'self-answered'. These outloud questions, which are often answered by the person also asking the question, do not appear to behave in the same way as questions directed at another person. There is a much greater likelihood of there being an evidential mismatch between the question and the answer, despite the fact that if a speaker should be able to anticipate anybody's evidential knowledge state, it should be their own. This indicates that something different is happening in self-answered questions. Whether this also occurs in other evidential languages with anticipatory question structures is not clear from the current literature. It is possible that other may draw on other default strategies for dealing with outloud questions that have no specific addressee, or are self-answered, and provide a new perspective on the nature of anticipatory evidentials in question structures.

Appendix A – recordings used in examples

Recordings are archived with Paradisec. The collection can be viewed at catalog.paradisec.org.au/collections/LG1.

Recording name	Recording type	Participants (gender, age)
LG1-091108-01	Family story	AL (f, 49); SL (f, 34)
LG1-101006-01	Video elicitation: Put Project	AL (f, 50)
LG1-101010-01	Jackal and Crow	AL (f, 50)
LG1-101027-02	Jackal and Crow	RL (m, 16); SUL (m, 5), 3 others (m, 4-5)
LG1-101120-02	20 questions	RL (m, 16), SNL (f, 11)
LG1-101124-03	Family story	SBL (m, 36); RL (m, 16)
LG1-120214-02	20 questions	AL (f, 53); SL (f, 38)
LG1-120304-01	Hidden objects	ST (f, 34)
LG1-120304-02	Hidden objects, optical illusion	KL (f, 26), CL (m, 25), ST (f, 34)
LG1-120305-01	conversation while making baskets	ST (f, 34), DML (f, 72)

Appendix B – transcription conventions

Transcription of speech is largely based on the IPA with some minor modifications; [ɹ] > r; [j] > y; [l] > lh; [h̥] > h; [ɔ] > o. Vowel length is represented by duplicated vowel form e.g. [a:] > aa. High and low tone are represented by acute and grave accents over the first vowel in a word respectively. Some Nepali or English borrowings are not marked for tone.

Most glossing abbreviations in this paper follow the Leipzig Conventions (Comrie, Haspelmath and Bickel, 2008), with some additional glosses.

1 first person, 2 second person, 3 third person, AUX auxiliary verb, ABL ablative, COP copula, DAT dative, DIR direct, DUB dubitative, EGO egophoric, EMPH emphatic, (Eng) English loanword, ERG ergative, F female, FOC focus, GEN genitive, IMP imperative, IPFV imperfective, LOC locative, M male, NEG negative, (Nep) Nepali loanword, NOM nominalizer, NON.PST non-past, PART particle, PE perceptual evidential, PL plural, PST past, Q question, SG singular, SUP suppletive.

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